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OHIO SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: LONG LIVES
THE KING
It is as much the duty of government to render prompt justice
against itself in favor of citizens as it is to administer the same be-
tween private individuals. The investigation and adjudication of
claims in their nature belong to the judicial department.'
Sovereign immunity, born at a time when monarchs ruled by
divine right, has little to sustain its continued existence but legislative
and judicial inertia. Commentators with surprising unanimity have
attacked this archaic doctrine from every quarter. Despite these re-
peated assaults, the doctrine retains its vitality in most jurisdictions.
The purpose of this comment is twofold: (1) to set out the Ohio posi-
tion on sovereign immunity, and (2) to propose a step, a modest one to
be sure, toward abolition of sovereign immunity in Ohio.
INTRODUCTION
The roots of sovereign immunity have been traced to Roman antiq-
uity, but the most frequent form in which this doctrine finds expres-
sion is in the English maxim, "The King can do no wrong." It is doubt-
ful whether anyone ever really believed that the king could do no
wrong, though Blackstone wrote, "The king, moreover is not only in-
capable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong .. .."I The real
basis of the king's immunity from suit was the impossibility of enforc-
ing a judgment against him.3 Thus, the ancient maxim might more ac-
curately be phrased, "The King cannot be held to account for his
wrongs."
How could a doctrine so discordant with American notions of re-
sponsible government be accepted as a part of our common law? The
answer rests more in terms of dollars and cents than in any legalistic
distinction. The colonial governments had contracted huge debts in
the prosecution of the Revolutionary War and in the formation of their
respective governments. A suit at the instance of each of the newly
formed states' creditors would be disastrous to the states' economy.
1 Statement by President Lincoln quoted in 6 Richardson, Messages and Papers of
the Presidents 51 (1897).
2 1 Blackstone, Commentaries* 239.
3 "For all jurisdiction implies superiority of power: authority to try would be vain
and idle, without an authority to redress; and the sentence of a court would be con-
temptible, unless that court had power to command the execution of it: but who, ....
shall command the king?" 1 Blackstone, Commentaries* 235.
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The states were understandably interested in the interpretation of
article III, section 2 of the Constitution which provides that, "the
judicial power (of the United States) shall extend... to controversies
... between a State and Citizens of another State." Hamilton argued
that the sovereign immunity of the states would not be abolished by
this section.
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable
to the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general
sense, and the general practice of mankind, and the exemption, as
one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the govern-
ment of every state in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a sur-
render of this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain
with the states, and the danger intimated must be merely ideal. The
contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding on the
conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive
force.4
Much to the alarm of the states this view was rejected in the
famous case of Chisholm v. Georgia5 which held that a citizen of one
state could sue another state in assumpsit in the federal courts. The
eleventh amendment, which overruled the result of the Chisholm case,
was immediately proposed and ratified: "The judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state."
In Hans v. Louisiana,6 the Supreme Court held that the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts did not extend to cases in which a state was
being sued by one of its own citizens without its consent. This case
coupled with the eleventh amendment and cases construing that amend-
ment7 have had the effect of completely excluding from the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts actions by citizens against a state without
its consent.
Claimants that have tried to sue in state courts have met with
little more success. States usually handle claims against them in one of
four ways: (1) The claimant may present a claim in the form of a
private bill to the state legislature. The legislature may either authorize
the claimant to bring suit in the state courts, or may grant relief itself
4 The Federalist No. 81, at 567 (Dawson ed. 1873). Madison opined, "It is not in
the power of individuals to call any state into court." 3 Elliot's Debates on the Federal
Constitution 533 (2d ed. 1891).
5 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
6 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Accord O'Conner v. Slaker, 22 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1927).
7 Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952); Fitts v. McGhee,
172 U.S. 516 (1899); Riley v. Worchester County Trust Co., 89 F. 2d 59 (1st Cir. 1937);
Dunnock v. Kansas State Highway Comm'n, 21 F. Supp. 882 (D.C. Kan. 1937).
[Vol. 28
COMMENT
by passing an appropriation bill.8 (2) The claimant may present his
claim to an administrative claims board.' This is the most frequently
used method. Five states in their constitutions have provided for an
administrative claims board.'" Most of the remaining states have
created such a board by statute."' (3) The claimant, after presenting
his claim to an administrative claims board, may have a right to appeal
to the courts from an adverse ruling of the board. At least eleven
states by statute provide for such an appeal. 12 (4) A plaintiff may sue
in the regular court system of the state or in a court of claims where one
has been established. This, of course, may only be done where the state
has consented to suit. States have been much more willing to consent
to suit on their contracts than for their torts. At least four states,
Illinois, New York, Vermont, and Washington, have consented to being
sued directly in the court to determine their tort liability.' 3 In two of
these states, Illinois and New York, suit is brought in a court of claims
sitting without a jury. At least fourteen states have by statute con-
sented to suit on their contracts.' 4 Also, courts have been much more
8 In some states an act authorizing the claimant to sue the state is violative of a
constitutional prohibition of "special laws." E.g., Ind. Const. art. IV, § 24; Ore. Const.
art. IV, § 24. A more complete discussion of legislative relief appears in Note, 25 Va. L.
Rev. 437 (1939). For a criticism of legislative relief, see Note, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 506, 509
(1955).
9 See generally Note, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 506 (1955).
30 Idaho Const. art. IV, § 18; Mich. Const. art. VI, § 20; Mont. Const. art. VII,
§ 20; Nev. Const. art. V, § 21; Utah Const. art. VII, § 13.
11 E.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 127.11 (Page Supp. 1965).
12 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann § 12-821 (1956); Cal. Gov't Code § 945.4; Iowa Code Ann.
tit. 2, ch. 25A (Supp. 1965); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 44.140 (Baldwin 1963); Miss. Code Ann.
§ 4387 (1957); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.010 (Supp. 1965); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-307 (1964);
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 72, § 1104 (Purdon Supp. 1965); S.D. Code § 33.0604 (Supp. 1960);
Va. Code § 8-752 (Supp. 1966) ; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 285.01 (1958). Idaho has constitutional
provisions which have been interpreted as allowing appeal from the state's administrative
claims board. Idaho Const. art. IV, § 18, art. V, § 10. One court has stated in dictum
that appeal may be had from a decision of an administrative claims board, just as from
any administrative agency, unless appeal is specifically denied. Kaufman Const. Co. v.
Holcomb, 357 Pa. 514, 55 A.2d 534 (1947).
13 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 439. 8(D) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965); N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act
§ 8; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 5601 (Supp. 1965); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 4.92.090 (Supp.
1965).
14 IIl. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 439.8(B) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965); Ind. Ann. Stat.
§ 4-1501 (Burns 1946); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 258, § 1 (1956); Mich. Stat. Ann. §
27A.6419 (1962); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 3173 (Supp. 1965); Mont. Rev. Code Ann. § 83.601
(1966); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-324 (1964); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 491.8 (1955); N.Y.
Ct. Cl. Act § 9; N.C. Const. art. IV, § 9; N.D. Cent. Code § 32-12-02 (1960); Ore. Rev.
Stat. § 30.230 (1961); S.D. Code § 33.0604 (Supp. 1960); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §
4.92.010 (Supp. 1965).
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liberal in interpreting statutes consenting to suit on contracts than in
interpreting statutes consenting to suit for tort. 5 In the absence of a
statute, a number of courts have held that a state impliedly waives its
immunity by entering into a contract.16 The constitutions of four states,
Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, and West Virginia, provide that the
state may never be made a defendant in a civil suit.17 However, three
of these states, Alabama, Arkansas, and West Virginia, have an admin-
istrative claims board, 8 and Illinois avoids the harshness of this con-
stitutional provision by considering its court of claims to be not a part
of the state's judiciary system.19
In the absence of legislation consenting to suit, some state courts
have ameliorated the harshness of a strict application of the sovereign
immunity rule by finding exceptions to it in certain circumstances. In
some cases it has been held that certain state agencies do not partake of
the state's immunity. 0 It is uniformly held that a mandamus action
where proper is not a suit against the state, but is one against the office
holder to compel him to perform his statutory duties.2 Likewise, an
equitable action to restrain a state officer from acting in violation of a
statute or in excess of his powers is one against the individual and not
the state.22 It is held as a general rule that a suit against a state officer
attacking the constitutionality of a statute of the state is not a suit
against the state.28  0
In at least three situations, the courts have found a waiver of a
15 Note, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 234, 251 (1956).
16 Ace Flying Service, Inc. v. Colorado Dept. of Ag., 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278
(1957); George & Lynch, Inc. v. State, - Del. - , 197 A.2d 734 (1964); Regents
of University System of Georgia v. Blanton, 179 Ga. 210, 176 S.E. 673 (1934); Derby
Road Bldg. Co. v. Commonwealth, 317 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. 1958); Seaway Co. v. Attorney
General, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. 1964);
17 Ala. Const. art. I, § 14; Ark. Const. art. V, § 20; InI. Const. art. IV, § 26; W. Va.
Const. art. VI, § 35.
18 Ala. Code tit. 55, § 333-34 (1960); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 13-1401 (1956); W. Va.
Code Ann. § 1143 (1961).
19 47 Nw. U.L. Rev. 914, 915 (1953).
20 Maryland Cas. Co. v. State Highway Comm'n of Missouri, 256 F. Supp. 666
(W.D. C.D. 1966); Hoffmeyer v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 83 Ohio L. Abs. 391, 166
N.E.2d 543 (1960); Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-flydro, 188 Okl. 506, 111
P.2d 488 (1941).
21 State ex rel. Cowan v. State Highway Comm'n, 195 Miss. 657, 13 So. 2d 614
(1943); Beronio v. Pension Comm'n, 130 N.J.L. 620, 33 A.2d 855 (1943).
22 Shellnut v. Arkansas State Game & Fish Comm'n, 222 Ark. 25, 258 S.W.2d 570
(1953); Reed v. McKeldin, 207 Md. 553, 115 A.2d 281 (1955).
23 White Eagle Oil & Ref. Co. v. Gunderson, 48 S.D. 608, 205 N.W. 614 (1925),
Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193, 116 N.W. 885 (1908). Annot., 43 A.L.R. 408 (1926).
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state's immunity: (1) by an appearance of the state in the case24 (2)
by a state officer where he has authority to waive the state's immunity 5
(3) by entering into a contract and thereby impliedly waiving the
state's immunity2 6
The supreme courts of some states, impatient with their legisla-
ture's failure to act, have not contented themselves with finding excep-
tions to or waivers of their state's immunity, but have abrogated sover-
eign immunity to varying degrees. These courts generally state that
they have a dual purpose in their ruling; to remedy the basic injustice
of the sovereign immunity rule, and to "prod" their state legislature
into affirmative action.
The federal government has been much more willing to give up
its immunity from suit than the states have been. In 1885, the United
States Court of Claims was established28 with authority to hear claims
against the government, but not including tort claims. This legislation
has been several times modified and strengthened.29 Where a claim
is for less than 10,000 dollars, the federal district courts now have
24 Maxwell v. Shivers, - Iowa - , 133 N.W.2d 709 (1965); 39th-40th Corp.
v. Port of New York Authority, 188 Misc. 657, 65 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1946).
25 Dunn v. Schmid, 239 Minn. 559, 60 N.W.2d 14 (1953).
26 Supra note 16.
27 Stone v. Arizona State Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963);
Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961);
Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, 136 Colo. 279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957);
Ace Flying Service, Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Ag., 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957);
Boxberger v. State Highway Dept., 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952); Hargrove v.
Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957); Moliter v. Kaneland Commu-
nity Unit Dist., 18 Ill.2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959); Williams v. City of Detroit, 364
Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1 (1961); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264
Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d 795 (1962); Rice v. Clark County, 79 Nev. 253, 382 P.2d 605
(1963); McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960); Holtz v. City of
Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962). The courts that have abrogated
sovereign immunity defend their right to make such a decision on the ground that it is
a judge-made doctrine and may, therefore, be abolished by the courts. For a discussion of
some of the recent cases abolishing sovereign immunity see, Lawton, "Disintegration of
Governmental Immunity," 30 Ins. Counsel J. 251 (1963).
28 Act of Feb. 24, 1885 Ch. 122, 10 Stat. 420.
29 In 1863, this legislation was modified to give a decree of the Court of Claims the
effect of a binding final judgment. Act. of March 3, 1863, Ch. 92, 12 Stat. 765. In 1887,
the district courts were given concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Claims of claims
for less than $1,000, and the circuit courts were given concurrent jurisdiction of claims
for more than $1,000 and less than $10,000. Tucker Act, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The latest amendment was in 1911. 36 Stat. 1093 (1911)
28 U.S.C. § 1346(A)(2)(1964). For a discussion of remedies under the Tucker Act see
Note, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 829, 875-84 (1957).
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concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Claims. ° Claims in excess
of 10,000 dollars may only be presented to the Court of Claims in
Washington, D.C. In 1946, the Federal Tort Claims Act was passed.'
It provides that the federal government may be sued in tort in the
district courts, and its liability established in substantially the same
manner as a private citizen.32 Most states lag far behind the federal
government's exemplary progress. Even the countries of western
Europe, the birthplace of sovereign immunity, have given up their im-
munity from suit in greater measure than the American states. 33
Criticism of sovereign immunity in the United States dates back to
the nineteenth century,34 but did not become widespread until late
in the 1920's.15 Since then the flow of criticism from bench36 and bar37
has continued unabated. This criticism has not gone unheeded. Within
the last ten years, significant progress has been made by statutory
30 28 U.S.C. § 1346(A)(2) (1964).
31 Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 28 U.S.C.).
32 However, in a tort claim against the United States a jury is not allowed. 28
U.S.C. § 2402 (1964). Also, the United States did not consent to being held liable for
all negligent conduct of its agents. The most notable area of non-liability is for "dis-
cretionary" acts.'
3 Blachly & Oatman, "Approaches to Governmental Liability in Tort: A Compara-
tive Survey," 9 Law & Contemp. Prob. 181 (1942); Setser, "The Immunities of the State
and Government Economic Activities," 24 Law & Contemp. Prob. 291, 303-07 (1959).
34 Young, "Liability of Municipal Corporations for Negligence," 18 Am. L. Rev. 1008
(1884).
35 At that time Professor Borchard published a series of articles. Borchard, "Gov-
ernment Liability in Torts (pts. 1-3)," 34 Yale LJ. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25); Borchard,
"Governmental Responsibility in Tort," 36 Yale LJ. 1039 (1927); Borchard, "Theories of
Governmental Responsibility in Tort," 28 Colum. L. Rev. 734 (1928). In these articles
Borchard argues that the sovereign immunity rule as applied in the United States cannot
be justified as a matter of legal precedent or on public policy grounds.
36 Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 216, 359 P.2d 457, 460, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 89, 92 (1961); Boxberger v. State Highway Dept., 126 Colo. 438, 441, 250 P.2d
1007, 1008 (1952); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130, 132 (Fla. 1957).
"Surely, with the passage of years, today's question (of abolition of sovereign immunity)
is become a game of quasi-legal basketball with legislators and judges tossing the sphere
back and forth with neither making visible effort to loop it for decisive result. It is time
one branch or the other act affirmatively . . ." Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich.
231, 273, 111 N.W.2d 1, 11 (1961).
37 One law review note estimates that over 200 articles and notes dealing with
sovereign immunity have been written since the turn of the century. Note, 36 Ind. L.J.
223 (1961). Illustrative of these are; Borchard's articles supra note 35; Jaffe, "Suits
Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity," 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1963);
James, "Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers," 22 U. Clii. L. Rev. 610
(1955); Leflar & Kantrowitz, "Tort Liability of the States," 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1363
(1954); Note, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 506 (1955).
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enactment and judicial fiat. However, Ohio has made no substantial
changes in this area since the creation of the Sundry Claims Board in
1917. 8
SOVEREIGN ImmUNITY RULE IN OHIO
The Ohio Constitution provides: 39 "Suit may be brought against
the state, in such courts and in such manner as may be provided by
law." The same provision or a similar one appears in the constitutions
of twenty states.40 This provision has been uniformly interperted as not
being self-executing, 41 and, therefore, unless the legislature makes some
further provision by law, there is no remedy against the state. Ohio
has adopted the traditional common law rule that the state cannot be
sued without its consent and this consent must be given by the legisla-
ture.43 This rule poses two questions: (1) What constitutes a suit
against the state? and (2) What constitutes consent to suit?
WHAT CONSTITUTES A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE
The bar of sovereign immunity cannot be avoided by bringing an
action nominally against a state official, where the liability sought to be
established is that of the state.4 There was a time when the courts
would look merely to the parties of record to determine if the suit
was one against the state,45 but it is now well established that the courts
will look behind the pleadings.48 Bringing a suit against a state official
does not automatically oust the court of jurisdiction, 47 nor does it
38 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 127.11 (Page Supp. 1965).
39 Ohio Const. art. 1, § 16.
40 E.g., Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 15; Cal. Const. art. 20, § 6; Pa. Const. art. 1,
§ 22.
41 State ex rel. Williams v. Glander, 148 Ohio St. 188, 74 N.E.2d 82, cert. denied,
332 U.S. 817 (1947); Palumbo v. Industrial Comm., 140 Ohio St. 54, 42 N.E.2d 766
(1942); Raudabaugh v. State, 96 Ohio St. 513, 118 N.E. 102 (1917).
42 Wolf v. Ohio State University Hosp., 170 Ohio St. 49, 162 N.E.2d 475 (1959);
Dunn v. Brammer, 102 Ohio App. 89, 141 NE.2d 193 (1956).
43 Palmer v. State, 18 Ohio Op. (ns.) 609, 26 Ohio Dec. 563 (1916) aff'd, 96 Ohio
St. 513, 118 N.E. 102 (1917), error dismissed, 248 U.S. 32 (1918); Dunn v. Brammer,
supra note 42.
44 State ex rel. Williams v. Glander, supra note 41; Reed v. Timberman, 65 Ohio
App. 182, 29 N.E.2d 446, appeal dismissed, 137 Ohio St. 524, 30 N.E.2d 993 (1940) ; State
ex rel. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Rhodes, 86 Ohio L. Abs. 390, 177 N.E.2d 557 (1960);
Ley v. Kirtley, 5 Ohio N.P. (ns.) 529, 18 Ohio Dec. 280 (1907).
45 Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 738 (1824).
46 State ex rel. Williams v. Glander, supra note 41; Reed v. Timberman, supra note
44; State ex rel. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Rhodes, supra note 44.
47 Equitable relief may be had against a state official where the act he threatens
to do is in violation of a statute or in excess of his powers, since such suits are con-
sidered to be against the individual and not against the state. Columbia L. Ins. Co. v.
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automatically avoid the bar of sovereign immunity. The crucial factor
in determining if the suit is one against the state is the nature of the
relief demanded. Where a judgment for the plaintiff might control the
action of the state or subject it to liability, the state is the real party in
interest, and the suit is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
even if the state is not a party of record.4
In a suit in which the plaintiff seeks money damages, the most
important consideration in determining if a suit is one against the state
is whether state funds will be required in paying the judgment. In
American Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Jones,49 the court noted that the
money sought was a refund of contributions previously paid into the
unemployment fund. ° In State ex rel. Nixon v. Merrell,1 plaintiff sub-
contractor sought a writ of mandamus against the Director of High-
ways to compel him to pay money to the subcontractor instead of
the prime contractor. In granting the writ, the court treated the state
as merely a "stakeholder," and, therefore, the proceeding was not
against the state. A similar argument was made in garnishment pro-
ceedings; 52 that is, no additional funds are required of the state, and
the state is merely required to act as a stakeholder of the employees'
wages. This argument was rejected, because the state could become
liable if it wrongfully paid the wages to the employee in violation of the
garnishment order.53 In Hoffmeyer v. Ohio Turnpike Commission,4
the court found that a suit against the Commission was not a suit
against the state. The court considered the scheme of the authorizing
legislation as a whole, and decided that the prevailing character of the
Hess, 28 Ohio App. 107, 162 N.E. 466 (1926), aff'd, 116 Ohio St. 416, 156 N.E. 504 (1927).
A suit against a state official attacking the constitutionality of a statute under which he
acts is not a suit against the state. Baldwin Forging & Tool Co. v. Griffith, 5 Ohio N.P.
(ns.) 566, 18 Ohio Dec. 261 (1907). Annot., 43 A.L.R. 408 (1926).
48 State ex rel. Williams v. Glander, supra note 41; State ex rel. Bd. of County
Comm'rs v. Rhodes, supra note 44.
49 152 Ohio St. 287, 89 N.E.2d 301 (1949).
50 "As we have suggested, if the instant action were simply an action for the re-
covery of money there would be some plausibility in the argument that it was an action
against the state and, therefore, not permitted." Id. at 296, 89 N.E.2d at 307.
51 126 Ohio St. 239, 189 N.E. 56 (1933). For a later opinion in this case, not
relevant to present considerations, see 127 Ohio St. 72, 186 N.E. 806 (1933).
52 Palumbo v. Industrial Comm'n, supra note 41.
53 Subsequent to the decision in Palumbo, a statute was enacted providing that a
creditor may maintain a garnishment proceeding against the state. Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 118.46 (Page 1954). For an interpretation of this statute, see 1959 Ohio Att'y Gen.
Ops. 923.
54 83 Ohio L. Abs. 391, 166 N.E.2d 543 (1960). For a discussion of this case in the
context of a comment urging the creation of a "competitive business activity" distinction
in suits against the state, see Comment, 21 Ohio St. LJ.648, 659 (1960).
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Commission was more in the nature of a separate entity engaged in
a private undertaking than an arm of the government engaged in a
governmental function. "The test used to determine entity and, there-
fore, liability is whether or not state funds would be subject to the
payment of the judgment in the event the Commission is found
liable."' ' In Wolf v. Ohio State University Hospital,56 the court found
the hospital to be an arm of the state and immune from suit because it
operated out of the General Fund of Ohio and had no independent
revenues with which to pay a judgment.
The sovereign immunity rule does not afford immunity to an
officer where a mandamus action57 is instituted against him to compel
performance of a duty imposed by law. 8 Mandamus is regarded as a
personal action against the state officer instead of an action in rem
directed against the office.59 However, the remedy of mandamus is
granted only in very limited circumstances. The following limitations
have been placed upon the remedy of mandamus at one time or another
by the Ohio courts: a writ of mandamus will not issue unless the relator
clearly shows his right to relief;;o a writ of mandamus will not issue
to compel the payment of a claim which is not liquidated in amount;61
a writ of mandamus will not issue where the relator has another ade-
quate remedy in the ordinary course of law;62 a writ of mandamus
will not issue to control the discretion of a state official; 63 a writ of
mandamus will not issue where the relator seeks enforcement of a
55 Id. at 393, 166 N.E.2d at 545.
56 Supra note 42.
57 Mandamus actions are authorized and governed in Ohio by Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. §§ 2731.01-2731.16 (Page 1954).
58 State ex tel. Nichols v. Gregory, 130 Ohio St. 165, 198 N.E. 182 (1935); Shade
v. Ferguson, 44 Ohio L. Abs. 332, 62 N.E,2d 642 (1945).
59 Caledonian Coal Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 432 (1905); State ex tel. McCabe v.
Industrial Comm'n, 132 Ohio St. 647, 9 N.E.2d 691 (1937).
60 State ex tel. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 162 Ohio St.
302, 123 N.E.2d 23 (1954); State ex rel. Coen v. Industrial Comm'n, 126 Ohio St. 550,
186 N.E. 398 (1933); State ex tel. Van Harlingen v. Bd. of Education, 104 Ohio St.
360, 136 NX. 196 (1922).
61 State ex rel. Barbourak v. Hunston, 173 Ohio St. 295, 181 N.E.2d 894 (1962);
Williams v. State ex tel. Gribben, 127 Ohio St. 398, 188 N.E. 654 (1933).
62 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2731.05 (Page 1954); State ex tel. Sibarco Corp. v.
Hicks, 177 Ohio St. 81, 202 N.E.2d 615 (1964); State ex tel. Adams v. Rockwell, 167
Ohio St. 15, 145 N.E.2d 665 (1957); State, ex tel. Rickets v. Balsly, 112 Ohio App. 555,
171 N.E.2d 538 (1960).
63 State ex tel. Sheppard v. Koblentz, 174 Ohio St. 120, 187 N.E.2d 40 (1962), cert.
denkd, 373 US. 911 (1963); State ex tel. Toledo-Maumee Raceways, Inc. v. Ohio
State Racing Comm'n, 172 Ohio St. 109, 173 N.E.2d 347 (1961) ; State ex tel. Gerspacher
v. Coffinberry, 157 Ohio St. 32, 104 N.E.2d 1 (1952).
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private right, and there is no question of official duty involved. 4 The
difficulty of fitting within the many restrictions placed on the remedy
of mandamus, the broad discretion conferred on most public officials,
the difficulty of showing a clear statutory duty, and the unlikelihood
that damages will be liquidated make mandamus a remedy seldom
available.
If the state is the real party in interest, whether nominally a party
or not, the form in which the action is cast will not avoid the total
defect of lack of consent of the state to suit. Thus an action in man-
damus or for a declaratory judgment will not avoid the bar of sovereign
immunity if the state is the real party in interest."'
WIAT CONSTITUTES CONSENT TO SUIT
It is a rule of construction in Ohio and elsewhere that statutes in
derogation of common law are to be strictly construed." Since a statute
giving consent to sue the state is in derogation of the common law
doctrine of sovereign immunity, the Ohio courts have refused to find
consent in the absence of clear and express language to that effect in
the code.
In Wolf v. Ohio State University Hospita0 7 the court refused
to find consent to suit where the code provided"8 that the Board of
Trustees of the Ohio State University were empowered to "sue and
be sued." The court reasoned that since this section did not provide
in what courts and in what manner suit could be brought against the
Board, it was not the intention of the legislature to consent to suits
being brought. Furthermore, the code provision establishing the powers
of the Board of Trustees was enacted in 1870, and the section of the
64 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2731.01 (Page 1954); State ex rel. Spellmire v. Kauer,
173 Ohio St. 279, 181 N.E.2d 695 (1962); State ex rel. Joseph v. Crossland, 152 Ohio
St. 199, 88 N.E.2d 289 (1949); State ex rel. Cope v. Cooper, 122 Ohio St. 321, 171
N.E. 399 (1930).
65 West Park Shopping Center, Inc. v. Masheter, 6 Ohio St. 2d 142, 216 N.E.2d 761
(1966) (declaratory judgment). State ex rel. Wilson v. Preston, 173 Ohio St. 203, 181
N.E.2d 31 (1962) (mandamus).
66 "Statutes which grant the privilege of suing the state or its political subdivisions
are in derogation of the common law and are therefore to be strictly construed, and
are not to be enlarged unless that purpose and intent is plainly and unequivocally in-
dicated by subsequent legislation." Ray v. Trenton Twp., 49 Ohio App. 172, 18 Ohio
L. Abs. 652, 195 N.E. 707 (1934). A similar rule prevails in most states. See, e.g.,
Miller v. Pillsbury, 164 Cal. 199, 128 Pac. 327 (1912); Smith v. State, 227 N.Y. 405, 125
N.E. 841 (1920); Daley v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., 140 Pa. Super. 203 (1940);
Automobile Sales Co. v. Johnson, 174 Tenn. 38, 122 S.W.2d 453, 120 AL.R. 370 (1938).
67 Supra note 42.
68 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3335.03 (Page 1954).
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constitution, 9 providing that the state may be sued in such manner
and courts as may be provided by law, was enacted in 1912. Hence, the
statute obviously was not enacted pursuant to the constitutional pro-
vision, and according to its terms the constitutional provision is not
self executing.
The Ohio courts have repeatedly refused to find a consent to suit
by waiver or by implication. A state officer cannot waive the state's
immunity by entering an appearance for the state.70 Also, the Attorney
General has no inherent authority to agree to payment by the state of
an indebtedness due the county, and in effect consent to an action by
the board of county commissioners against the state.'1 Likewise, the
Director of Highways has no authority to agree to pay damages for
breach of a contract he has entered into in the state's behalf." It has
been argued that a statute 3 providing that the Director of Highways
may not be sued in any court outside of Franklin County impliedly
consents to suit in Franklin County. The court held that this section
merely established the venue of the action, and did not undertake to
create statutory liability.' 4 In short, the Ohio courts have taken a very
narrow view of what constitutes consent to suit. The state may only
be sued in accordance with legislation which clearly expresses the
state's consent to suit.
7 5
Consent to suit has been granted in piecemeal fashion in Ohio.
These consent-to-suit statutes are scattered throughout the code.7 6
69 Ohio Const. art. I, § 16.
70 Reed v. Timberman, supra note 44.
71 State ex rel. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Rhodes, supra note 44.
72 1954 Ohio Att'y Gen. Ops. 700.
73 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5501.18 (Page 1954).
74 Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Garrettsville, 67 Ohio L. Abs. 370, 120
N.E.2d 501 (1953).
75 Palmer v. State, supra note 43; Dunn v. Brammer, supra note 42.
76 The following listing of consent-to-suit statutes, though not exhaustive, is fairly
complete.
Consent to sue the state.-The state may be made a party to a proceeding to sell
real estate in which it has a claim, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5301.24 (Page 1954); appeal
to a court of common pleas from an adverse ruling of an administrative agency is al-
lowed in certain circumstances, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 119.12, 123.16.1 (Page 1965);
the Director of Highways may be sued in a condemnation proceeding if the landowner
follows the procedures outlined in the code, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5519.01
(Page 1954); a creditor may maintain a garnishment proceeding against the state,
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 115.46 (Page 1954); an action against the state may be main-
tained for the recovery of fees paid under protest to the Secretary of State, Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 111.19 (Page 1954); suit may be brought against the state to recover
on water conservation bonds, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1523.10 (Page 1954).
Consent to sue counties.The board of county commissioners is liable in its official
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Noticeably absent from any listing of statutes in which the General
Assembly has given consent to suit is any provision for suit against
the state on its contracts or for its torts.
Or1O CLAIMS PROCEDURE
As to most matters, the state of Ohio has chosen not to have its
liability determined in a court of law. Instead, the General Assembly
in 1917 established the Sundry Claims Board.7  By establishing this
board the General Assembly has served notice that it does not ascribe
to the maxim, "The King can do no wrong." Ohio is not immune from
doing wrong, it is immune from suit. The Board has three main func-
tions: (1) to receive and investigate claims, (2) to hear and decide
claims, and (3) to make recommendations to the General Assembly.
The Board has limited its jurisdiction to those cases in which
no other form of remedy has been established by the state statutes.
Thus, a damage claim for breach of a contract entered into on behalf
of the state by the Director of Highways can only be brought to the
capacity for damages received by reason of its negligence in not keeping a road or
bridge in repair, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 305.12 (Page 1954); a person taken from
officers of justice by a mob and assaulted may recover up to $1,000, Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 3761.02 (Page 1954) ; the legal representative of a person who dies from injuries
received from lynching by a mob may recover up to $5,000, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
3761.04 (Page 1954); appeal to the probate court may be had from an adverse ruling
by the commissioners on a claim for damages to livestock injured by a dog, Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. §§ 955.29, 955.37 (Page 1954) ; a person may recover up to $200 for medical
expenses as a result of being bitten by a rabied dog, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 955.41.-.42
(Page 1954).
Consent to sue a municipality.-A municipality is liable for injury to person or
property caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle, with the exception of
the police and fire departments while engaged in their official duties, Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 701.02 (Page 1954).
Consent to sue a township.--"Each board of township trustees shall be liable,
in its official capacity, for damages received by any person, firm or corporation by
reason of the negligence or carelessness of such board in the discharge of its official
duties." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5571.10 (Page 1954). The statutory liability of the
township trustees created by this section is probably limited to roads, road machinery,
or equipment used with relation to roads since it is a part of title 55, Ohio's highway
code.
Consent to sue a board of education.--"The Board of Education of each school
district shall be a body politic and corporate, and as such, capable of suing and being
sued, contracting and being contracted with, acquiring, holding, possessing, and dis-
posing of real and personal property . . ." Ohio Rev. Code Ann § 3313.17 (Page 1954).
77 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 127.11 (Page Supp. 1965). See generally Stock, "Sundry
Claims," 1965 Reference Manual of the Ohio Legal Center Institute XII; Walsh, "The
Ohio Sundry Claims Board," 9 Ohio St. L.J. 437 (1948).
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Sundry Claims Board, since the state has not consented to be sued on
its contracts.78
The procedure before the Board is not complicated. Claimants
may be represented by counsel, but in about one-half of the cases they
are not. Frequently, the claimants themselves choose not to appear.
The actual hearing is conducted in an informal manner. In fact, the
atmosphere of a judicial proceeding is completely lacking in most
cases. After hearing a claim, the Board may approve the claim, dis-
approve the claim, or approve the claim with conditions or limitations.
There is no provision for appeal or review of a decision of the
Sundry Claims Board. This is probably because the findings of the
Board serve only as a recommendation to the General Assembly, and
a determination by a court would be of no more binding effect on the
General Assembly.
In deciding claims against the state, the test applied by the Board
is whether or not the claimant has stated and proved what would be
a good cause of action against a private litigant in a court of law. Obvi-
ously, the best place to determine this question is in a court of law.
Surely, the General Assembly by establishing a Sundry Claims Board
did not intend to assert that the Board is better qualified than a court
of law to determine liability. What the legislature did intend to do was
limit the size of damage awards granted by juries. It is generally
conceded that juries will dig more deeply into a "long pocket," and
who has a longer pocket than the state? It is probably for this reason
that four of the five members of the Board are also financial officers
of the state.70
The legislature's argument goes like this. The state provides a
number of very valuable services. As an inevitable consequence, a
few private parties are injured. To allow a suit against the state at the
instance of each of the aggrieved parties, and to allow a jury to set the
damages might place an intolerable burden on the state's economy and
halt the flow of these valuable state services. Balancing the interests,
it is more in the public welfare to have the benefit of the state's services
than to allow a few injured plaintiffs their day in court.
Instead the legislature has established the Sundry Claims Board.
Through this Board, the claimant is allowed some redress for his
grievances, and at the same time the state is assured that it will be
78 1954 Ohio Att'y Gen. Ops. 700.
70 The Sundry Claims Board is composed of five members: The Director of
Finance, the Auditor of State, the Chairman of the House Finance Committee, the
Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and the Attorney General.
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able to continue providing its services without fear of large money
demands through lawsuits.
The General Assembly's fiscal-mindedness is commendable. How-
ever, what little statistical data is available indicates that their fears
are unfounded. 0 After New York consented to having its liability
determined in the same manner as a private citizen, no intolerable
burden on the state's economy was experienced."' fllinois has had a
similar experience."
A MODEST PROPOSAL
With the increase of government contact with the individual,
sovereign immunity has been increasingly questioned. Courts and leg-
islatures have been quicker to do away with immunity from suit in
contract than in tort. 3 By the turn of the century, several states and
the federal government had already given up their immunity from
suit on their contracts.84 This is a step long overdue in Ohio. There is
good reason for a state to be more willing to surrender its immunity in
contract than tort.
A tort is usually an accidental relationship. Frequently, the parties
have nothing more in common than the fact that they ran their vehicles
together in an intersection. The number of torts for which a state
could be held responsible is not predictable. Consequently, the demands
on the treasury are not foreseeable. It is this uncertainty which is the
cause of the General Assembly's reluctance to do away with its
sovereign immunity.
No matter what validity this argument possesses as applied to a
tort claim, it does not apply to a contract claim. A contract is a con-
sensual relationship. The parties are aware of one another's identity
and frequently deal face to face. The state has absolute control over
how many contracts it enters into.85 Because of this, the state has con-
80 Note, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 506, 517 (1955).
81 MacDonald, "The Administration of a Tort Liability Law in New York," 9
Law & Contemp. Prob. 262, 280 (1942).
82 Comment, 47 Nw. U.L. Rev. 914, 917 (1953).
83 Note, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 234, 251 (1956).
84 The federal government did away with its immunity from suit on its contracts
in 1855, supra note 8; Indiana in 1889, Ind. Acts, ch. 128, § 1 (1889); North Dakota
in 1895, NI). Rev. Code, § 5929 (1895).
85 "No officer, board, or commission of the state shall enter into any contract ...
unless the director of finance first certifies that there is a balance in the appropriation,
not otherwise obligated to pay precedent obligations, pursuant to which such obliga-
tion is required to be paid." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 131.17 (Page 1954). The above
provision is mandatory. State ex rel. Miller v. Guthery, 125 Ohio St. 603, 183 N.E. 781
(1932); State ex rel. S. Monroe & Co. v. Baker, 112 Ohio St. 356, 147 N.E. 501 (1925).
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trol over the demands on the state treasury by parties claiming the
state has breached a contract. One who deals with an officer or agent
of the state must, at this peril, ascertain the nature and extent of the
powers of such officer or agent.8 6 If an officer or agent enters into a
contract beyond his express authority, the contract is void or at least
voidable by the state.87 If the officer or agent has apparent authority
but no express authority, the contract will likewise be void.88 Under
such circumstances it is virtually impossible for the state to be bur-
dened with unforeseen contractual obligations.
A tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him. The damages allow-
able for loss of a finger will depend on whose finger was lost. A concert
pianist may be given a substantial sum for loss of earnings, whereas,
a plaintiff not required to use his fingers in his work may recover
nothing for loss of earnings. This uncertainty as to the elements of a
damage award has caused the General Assembly to be reluctant to
surrender its immunity from suit in tort.
However, a breach of contract case does not produce the same
problems. The plaintiff can only recover for those damages that were
contemplated by the parties or were reasonably foreseeable at the time
the contract was made. The plaintiff may suffer additional damages,
but for these he can have no recovery.
The measure of damages in a tort case is necessarily somewhat
inexact. Such items as pain and suffering, loss of consortium, mental
anguish, and loss of future earnings, are not capable of precise measure-
ment. In such a case, the jury is allowed a great deal of latitude in
determining the dollar amount of an award. This latitude coupled with
the state's "long pocket" could produce excessive damage awards
against the state. This possibility is anathema to the General Assembly,
and it is for this reason that the Sundry Claims Board was established.
The jury is not allowed as much latitude in setting damages in a
breach of contract case as in a tort case. The parties to a contract make
"An officer or agent of the state . . . shall make no contract binding or purporting to
bind the state . . . to pay any sum of money not previously appropriated for the pur-
pose for which such contract is made, and remaining unexpended and applicable thereto,
unless such officer or agent has been authorized to make such contract. If such officer
or agent makes or participates in making a contract without such appropriation or
authority, he is personally liable thereon and the state . . . shall not be liable thereon."
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3.12 (Page 1954).
86 Allen v. Lutz, 111 Ohio St. 333, 145 N.E. 483 (1924), error dismissed, 273 U.S.
654 (1927); J.S. Bradley Co. v. Squire, 65 Ohio App. 186, 29 N.E.2d 430 (1939).
87 Webster v. Clear, 49 Ohio St. 392 (1892); Roseberry v. Hollister, 4 Ohio St.
297 (1854); McBroom v. Watkins, 11 Ohio N.P. (ns.) 337, 21 Ohio Dec. 505, error
dismissed, 10 Ohio L. Rep. 24 (1911); 1957 Ohio Att'y Gen. Ops. 418.
88 State v. Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co., 1 Ohio N.P. 292, 2 Ohio Dec. 300 (1895).
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mutual promises, and it is for breach of these only that recovery may
be had. The contract itself provides the measure of damages. If the
state breaches a contract for the purchase of equipment, the vendor's
measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and
the market price. If the state breaches an employment contract, the
measure of damages is the contract rate less what the employee could
have made or did make by other employment. If the state breaches a
construction contract, the contractor's measure of damages is the con-
tract price less the savings to the contractor by not having to complete
the contract. In all of these cases, damages can be determined with
substantial accuracy. The amount of damages does not depend on some
imponderable, like mental anguish, but can be determined by looking
at the contract price and comparing this with some relatively fixed
standard, such as market value, custom, or established experience.
Where it appears at the time the contract is entered into that the
amount of damages will be difficult to predict, a liquidated damage
clause may be inserted. If this clause is a good faith attempt to arrive
at a damage estimate and is not a penalty, it will serve as a limit on
the damages recoverable.
Sovereign immunity has never been in tune with American notions
of responsible government. The basic argument for its retention is
financial necessity. But why is it necessary that the State of Ohio be
legally free from the obligations it assumes by solemnly entering into
a contract? When Ohio enters into a contract with a private citizen, it
promises him the benefit of its performance. However, if the citizen
seeks to enforce his contract, the state enters the defense of nonsu-
ability. All parties to every contract should have the right to have a
court of law determine who is in error when a dispute arises. State
officers are not equipped to engage in this function which is historically
and inherently that of the judiciary. Neither are they elected with this
function in mind.
A criticism often leveled at administrative claims boards is that
their awards are strongly influenced by political pressures.8 9 By trans-
ferring the power to hear cases to the judiciary, all beliefs that an
award is a gift or a matter of politics are destroyed. Eliminating con-
tract claims from the jurisdiction of the Sundry Claims Board would
have the added benefit of lightening the work load of the already over-
burdened public officials who are members of the Board, 0 and would
89 Oberst, "The Board of Claims Act of 1950," 39 Ky. L.J. 35, 41 (1950); Note, 44
Harv. L. Rev. 432, 435 (1931).
90 The members of the Sundry Claims Board are also members of the State Con-
trolling Board and the Emergency Board.
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permit a more thorough consideration of those claims remaining
within the Board's jurisdiction.
Why should the proposed change come from the legislature and
not the courts? The sovereign immunity rule is so firmly entrenched in
Ohio jurisprudence that it is too much to hope that the Ohio Supreme
Court will overrule the multitude of cases that has accumulated. The
Ohio Supreme Court has continually and quite recently referred this
problem to the legislature.91 The supreme courts of some states, im-
patient with their legislatures' failure to act, have abrogated sovereign
immunity to varying degrees.92 However, the General Assembly is the
better forum in which to bring about such a change. 3 A court of law
deals with one case at a time. In formulating a rule it is limited by the
"narrowly confined factual context of a specific lawsuit.' 94 A court
pronouncement that sovereign immunity is abolished as to contract
claims would create more problems than it would solve. Many im-
portant questions would be left unanswered: What courts have juris-
diction of a contract claim against the state? Where is the venue of
such a claim to be set? Will the statute of limitations apply to contract
claims against the state? Upon whom should service of process be
made? Must a claim first be filed with the department involved before
suit can be brought? These questions are best answered by the General
Assembly in a comprehensive piece of legislation. The General As-
sembly can conduct extensive research through its committees or
through the Legislative Research Commission. California has made
good use of the research commission approach. 95 It should be noted
that any statute surrendering the state's immunity should clearly ex-
press the legislature's intent."6 If the statute is at all ambiguous it may
91 Hack v. Salem, 174 Ohio St. 383, 384, 189 N.E.2d 857, 858 (1963).
92 See Lawton, "Disintegration of Governmental Immunity," 30 Ins. Counsel 3. 251
(1963).
93 Van Alstyne, "Governmental Tort Liability: judicial Lawmaking in a Statutory
Milieu," 15 Stan. L. Rev. 163 (1963).
94 Id. at 163.
95 California Law Revision Commission, Sovereign Immunity Study (1963); Van
Alstyne, California Government Tort Liability (1964). The California Law Revision
Commission met almost continually for two years before making its report. The result
is a detailed and workable scheme of bringing claims against the state. One noted author
has praised the Commission's work in the following words: "Although these docu-
ments are focused on California, the thinking will be of great usefulness to all states
confronted with the problem of sovereign responsibility. The quality of the California
studies is very high, and they push forward the frontiers of understanding." 3 Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise (Supp. 1965, § 25.17).
96 Some courts have reached ludicrous results where the statute creating a gov-
ernmental unit also provides that the unit may "sue and be sued." Such clauses have
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be construed in a manner inconsistent with legislative intent because
statutes in derogation of common law are strictly construed.
As federal programs continue to expand, state citizens are with
increasing regularity looking to the federal government when in need
of aid. Any move to foster more respect to the state would be bene-
ficial. Enacting legislation such as here proposed would point out to
the citizens of Ohio that their government recognizes its responsibility
to submit itself to legal process the same as its citizens.
The only rational argument for retention of the sovereign im-
munity rule is that it is a "necessary evil." At least as to contract
claims, immunity is not necessary, but it is an evil.
It would seem that abolition of sovereign immunity is inevitable.
If this archaic doctrine is to meet its end, abolition of immunity from
suit in contract is the logical starting point.
Ronald E. Schultz
been interpreted as merely waiving the government's immunity from suit, but not
waiving its immunity from liability. As pointed out by one commentator, this entities
the plaintiff to a free trip to the courthouse. See Leflar & Kantrowitz, "Tort Liability
of the States," 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1363, 1408 (1954). Ohio reached such a result in Wolf
v. Ohio State University Hosp. 170 Ohio St. 49, 162 N.E.2d 475 (1959).
